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Postscript 
Ye knowe ek that in forme of speche is chaunge 
Withinne a thousand yeer, and wordes tho 
That hadden pris, now wonder nyce and straunge 
Us thinketh hem, and yet thei spake hem so, 
And spedde as wel in love as men now do; 
Ek for to wynnen love in sondry ages, 
In sondry londes, sondry ben usages. 
Chaucer's meditative, rhyme royal stanza, his beautifully modulated and 
flowing lines in iambic pentameter (from the opening of Book II of Troilus 
and Criseyde), takes up the theme of the book under review here, Timothy 
Steele's Missing Measures. 
* 
But whereas Chaucer seems philosophical about 
change and inclined to wonder but not complain about how different the 
ways of speech and of speeding in love have been, Steele is considerably less 
relaxed. It is true that Chaucer may not be speaking expressly of poetry at 
this moment ?though his linkage of speech to speeding in love hints 
otherwise?and he certainly had no reason to count the loss of meter 
among those changes. His prospect, instead, seems to have been one from 
which he could survey difference rather than lament loss. For "loss" usu 
ally turns out to be an expression of vested interest?which Chaucer 
avoids with his even-handed regard for past and present ?and Steele, 
whose reading is wide and synthesis of learning impressive, might have 
arrived at a wiser book had he found occasion, somewhere along the way, 
to murmur over and over to himself Chaucer's lines. 
Missing Measures is a brave book in its willingness to stand against what 
Steele must often see, but is too polite to call, a "blood-dimmed tide." It is 
also impressively learned but finally a rather sad piece of work. Compre 
hensive, clearly written, and handsomely produced by The University of 
Arkansas Press, it is a volume worthy of lasting in one's personal library. It 
is a book that reads best as an expansion of the Princeton Encyclopedia of 
* 
Missing Measures: Modern Poetry and the Revolt against Meter. University of 
Arkansas Press, 1990. 327 pp. + index. 
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Poetry and Poetics, for its assemblage and synthesis of information is more 
valuable than its critical stance. Steele wears his heart on his sleeve, and his 
overview of the loss of measure in our time intends clearly to suggest that 
unlike whoever it was who said, "too much of a good thing is not nearly 
enough," we have in this instance gone way too far. Such beliefs, 
reiterated almost rhythmically throughout his book, hardly come as the 
reasonable conclusions brought from the history herein examined. They 
arise instead as beliefs given weight and color by the deep background he 
has filled in. Indeed, there is a certain unintentional irony to the volume, 
in that the history of poetics Steele reviews, from Aristotelian seeds of 
doubt about meter, giving it at best second place to plot and material in 
what makes a poem, to the modernist revolution dismissing traditional 
meter as "verse," could have given impetus as easily to a volume called, 
say, Opening Fields, with conclusions as predictable as the clich? of that 
title suggests, and of course a lot more friendly to a broad range of con 
temporary practice. 
In saying so much, I do not wish to deny Mr. Steele his forceful 
moments. Here are a few passages that give you his flavor, beginning with 
a thought on our post-romantic allegiance to "organic" structures: 
Natural organisms do not "originate" their own laws. . . . An 
aspen, for instance, does not freely elect, when a seedling, to 
grow up to be a medium-sized tree with a smooth, light 
colored trunk and fine-toothed leaves. (196) 
It seems terribly simple-minded to say of a medium that allowed 
for the poems of Homer and Virgil and Dante and Shakespeare 
that it is a straitjacket. (285) 
It would be absurd to call Sophocles, Petrarch, or Reats a "for 
malist." (290) 
Or, quoting Hulme, "I object even to the best of the romantics. ... I 
object to the sloppiness which doesn't consider that a poem is a poem 
unless it is moaning or whining about something or other" (300). Or, 
again, see the note on p. 307 that traces Williams's theory of the variable 
foot, "possibly," to Winters's essay, "The Scansion of Free Verse." 
But it would be perverse to reduce consideration of Missing Measures to a 
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recitation of its values more or less sharply expressed. It is a fact that 
Steele's overall attitude is that of lament and that it would have been a very 
different book had its title not suggested "paradise lost" so much as, per 
haps, "the world was all before them." But it is surely a more important 
fact that whether one sees loss or gain, measures are mostly missing from 
contemporary poetry, and the story of how that occurred is full of lore 
about poetry that should matter to any serious practitioner or reader. 
This is a story that Steele gives himself to with surpassing dedication. 
As he is fond of quoting classical authors, he must surely know "that a big 
book is a big evil," being the more certain to preserve error. His citations, 
however, are generous enough for suspicious readers to look further for 
themselves. It is a story that begins in the classical world, that is refracted 
through the prism of the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, that 
branches, then, through the realms of seventeenth, eighteenth, and nine 
teenth century science and prose fiction, and that coalesces in the great 
modernists at the head of our century. It is a story that refers repeatedly to 
Aristotle, Plato, Quintillian, and Cicero, to Servius, Severus, and Sidney, 
to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Dryden, and Rant, to Coleridge, Words 
worth, Poe, and Mallarm?, to Eliot, Pound, Ford, Lewis, Williams, and 
many more. It is a long story that traces an incipient distinction between 
verse and poetry until a judgment of the ancient world's, that verse is less 
intrinsic to poetry than plot and content, becomes an antithesis in our cen 
tury. For the ancients, to say that verse was less crucial to poetry than plot 
was not to deny the central part of verse in the whole. But for Eliot, 
writing of Ripling, verse was to be distinguished from poetry largely on 
the basis of its content being too clear. It is one of the distinctions of this 
volume, that when Steele deals with the modernists, whose children we 
still are, he does so with considerable sympathy so that their desires to 
write poetry as fine as prose, to speak of "writing," not just of poetry, to 
obscure the formal elements of poetry by deflecting our eyes (and ears) 
from them, and to arrive at a new metrics all seem natural, indeed inevit 
able developments, as inevitable as the fact that in the form of speech there 
will be change. 
If verse, as classical writers decided, is not the essence of poetry, it 
follows that poetry might be found in prose. This turns out to have been a 
classical idea, applied to Plato long before others thought to apply it to 
Don Quixote or Moby-Dick. This correlation of the two forms has nothing 
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essentially to do with meter. Still, early prose, Steele explains, sought 
much of its order "on the model of poetry," seeking rhythm but not 
meter; and then, in the evolution of things, we find poetry in our own 
century "seeking freedom on the model of prose." 
Though this is a large story and Steele's treatment of it admirably com 
prehensive, there are portions of it that he seems oddly to have left out. 
Given his focus on the later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, it seems 
strange that he refers to Shakespeare rather rarely, and abruptly, only as an 
occasional, hortatory example of how one can write well in meter, or of 
how the really "great writers" eschewed experiment, and that he all but 
leaves Chaucer out. Steele does mention in passing Chaucer's slighting 
reference to his own 
"rym doggeral," but he doesn't reflect as he might on 
Chaucer's history of writing an increasingly looser verse, moving from a 
four-beat line to the intricate fluency of his rhyme royal stanzas, to the 
iambic pentameter couplets of The Canterbury Tales. In those shifts alone 
one 
might sense a lowering threshold for what begins to hint of doggeral, 
all of which puts pressure on later writers. Shakespeare's case is still more 
persuasive, as he moved from the tightly metered and extensively rhymed 
comedies of his early years to a mix of prose and verse in Hamlet, with a 
few of the more 
"poetic" passages being in prose, to the frequent extra syl 
lables and more relaxed pentameters of his later romances, with their occa 
sional thirteen and fourteen syllable lines. In both poets we hear hints, just 
faint, then bolder, of an urge, over time, to relax the metrical standard, a 
hint of moving toward prose. Thus if phylogeny expands upon ontogeny, 
the seed of free verse in our own tongue germinated long ago. Or as Henri 
Coulette, a poet generously acknowledged here has written, "When we 
were 
naming the beasts, that was Paradise; when we started counting 
them, it was the modern world." Counting implies extension, which 
brings us onto the pathways of prose. 
In leaning his strong shoulder against the wheel of change, Steele 
resorts, unfortunately, to some misrepresentation, or perhaps he simply 
allows his bias to overcome his better judgment. Here, for example, is a 
passage that seems to state his central belief so clearly that I felt sure I'd 
read it at least twice until, skimming the whole book two or three more 
times, I was unable to find a second instance: 
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Aristotle believed no less firmly than Plato that measure is a 
fundamental need of the human spirit and that one of the pur 
poses of poetry is to answer this need. As Aristotle says in Rhet 
oric 3.8.2-3, "that which is unlimited is unpleasant and 
unknowable. Now all things are limited by number, and the 
number belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which 
the meters are divisions." (169) 
It is the "measure as a fundamental need of the human spirit" part that 
feels the most urgent here, and that is ascribed to Plato; but you will 
notice that it is at best a paraphrase of whatever Plato wrote. Steele doesn't 
lead us directly to his source, but his notes on a related passage (113) refer 
to Timeaus 47 d-e: 
Music too, in so far as it uses audible sound, was bestowed for 
the sake of harmony. And harmony, which has motions akin to 
the revolutions of the Soul within us, was given by the Muses 
to him who makes intelligent use of the Muses, not as an aid to 
irrational pleasure, as is now supposed, but as an auxiliary to 
the inner revolution of the Soul, when it has lost its harmony, 
to assist it in restoring it to order and concord with itself. 
Now whereas Steele establishes early the equivalence of "measure" and 
"meter" (21), neither is in evidence here. "Harmony" is as close as we get, 
with 
"rhythm" making an appearance in the next sentence. This passage 
remains at some distance from any explicit notion about meter. It is in a 
sequence of passages discussing the relative value of our senses, with sight 
coming first, because it allows us to see the sun, and the heavens, and thus 
deduce universal order. Hearing is the next aid to be enlisted in correcting 
"irrational pleasure"; the sentences quoted above come just after Plato 
notes the contributions of speech. "Music too" is in addition to speech, 
not the primary thing, but a supplement. And though meter, or measure, 
surely bears close relation to music, it is the subject of this passage only by 
interpretation or metaphoric extension. I can well imagine an inspiring 
lecturer, an Ion, bringing this passage under discussion and saying, "What 
Plato is really getting at here is that measure is a fundamental need of the 
human spirit, and by 'intelligent use of the Muses,' he means writing 
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poetry well, which means in meter, which counters 'irrational pleasure' 
and restores us to 'the inner revolution of the Soul,' by which means we 
answer to that need." But an inspired lecturer would take responsibility 
for such a passage as his or her own interpretation, not try to pass it off as 
precisely what Plato believed. 
Unfortunately, we can go further. The passage Steele does quote is 
from Aristotle's Rhetoric and is as he quotes it, from the Loeb edition as I 
have used for Plato. The only inconvenience is its context which is in a dis 
cussion of using rhythm but not meter in speech. The context doesn't alter 
Aristotle's observations about meter itself, but the two passages together, 
Plato's and Aristotle's, are at least a little eerily uncomfortable for Steele's 
purposes, given their prior attention to aspects of speech. That is part of 
what I mean when I say the same evidence as assembled here might have 
led to a very different and more Chaucerian or Williamsesque sort of 
story. Here is the lead-in to what Steele quotes: 
The form of diction should be neither metrical nor without 
rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks persuasiveness, for it appears 
artificial, and at the same time it distracts the hearer's attention, 
since it sets him on the watch for the recurrence of such and 
such a cadence; just as, when the public criers ask, "Whom 
does the emancipated choose for his patron?" the children 
shout "Creon." If it is without rhythm, it is unlimited, 
whereas it ought to be limited (but not by meter); for that 
which is unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. . . . 
Beginning his own quotation just after that parenthesis, not to mention 
after those other remarks, which foresee our difficulty with meter so pre 
cisely, is, to say the least, adroit. 
Even were these passages not in doubt as to Steele's use of them, they 
could be challenged from another point of view. Arguments from author 
ity are best raised to be questioned, which Steele does too little of here, 
unless his authorities are Pound, Eliot, and Williams and those who have 
come after them. But even Plato and Aristotle said their silly things and 
stated claims as universals which we have come to see as limited at best. 
Assume, for a moment, that Plato believed in the need of measure as Steele 
suggests. Is all this really true? Is measure ^fundamental need of the human 
spirit? 
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What of Hebrew poetry? The Psalms have their formal aspects too, 
their 
"parallelismus membrorum" (Princeton Encyclopedia) of "sameness, 
antithesis, and complement." But is that "measure" or is that something 
else? And if Hebrew poetry might place a wedge in our story, opening it 
up a little to other influences, to other kinds of cadence, why not risk some 
speculation beyond all that? 
In short, what I find disappointing about Missing Measures, in spite of its 
learning and patient exposition, is that it fails in a degree of generous 
speculation that it could confidently risk. To be sure, Steele mentions the 
Psalms as an example for Whitman, but he is happier to point out Martin 
Tupper's "Rhythmics" (16, 298 n.) as a model. The Psalms, however, 
remain a plausible model for poetry in our time. Might they not suggest 
the possibility, now and in the future, of an unmetered poetry in English? 
Might not experimentation with such forms lead to a poetry neither 
metered nor adequately defined as "free verse" that it would be premature 
to discount? And if Hebrew poetry provides such hints, well, we all know 
of other non-western examples from which other forms of verse, rich in 
rhythm but not meter, could develop. 
Another possibility that Steele could at least acknowledge is that 
women 
writing now might have reason enough to eschew an inherited 
metrics. Not all women need feel that. Some obviously do. But rather 
than observing only that the expected discovery of a new metrics that the 
modernists had predicted hasn't come about and so is a dead idea, it might 
be fairer to say that its hypothetical discovery has just begun. Such specula 
tion 
might erode a little the importance of meter that Steele seeks to 
defend, but it would hardly detract from the achievements of meter in the 
tradition we still know best. It would simply tend to make that tradition a 
poetry among poetries rather than Poetry itself. 
Steele could also be more daring in extending ideas he does advance, as 
when he challenges the familiar assertion that poets who write in meter 
are un-American or anti-democratic, or its counterpart, that free verse is 
"intrinsically 'democratic' 
" 
Not only does this claim run blindly against 
the anti-democratic attitudes of several of the great modernists, but also, 
In one key sense, free versification is more "dictatorial" than 
traditional versification. I will do what I will do, the free verse 
poet says to his [sic] audience, and it is not yours to wonder 
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why. He versifies by fiat. In contrast, meter is, as Wordsworth 
eloquently observes, like common law. Its basic statutes are 
few and clear; it asks obedience of and offers rewards to all 
poets equally. (283) 
Here is an instance in which Steele could be less gentle than he is and argue 
that meter and forms scarcely define a domain of pride and assertive, mas 
culine control of the earth. The notion that they do is another tiresome, 
contemporary suggestion. Wordsworth's notion is at least as probable. In 
meter and forms one can find the means of submitting to something larger 
than the self and the chance to be both a conduit for tradition and an 
example of tradition's capacity for renewal. Similarly, an ecological poet of 
the moment, one who "acts globally and thinks locally," might be at least 
as interested in recycling older forms as in thrusting forward new ones, if 
only because the mnemonic advantages of the older forms could save a few 
trees. So Steele could counterattack and even argue that some free verse 
makers, who insist on systems all their own, who ask you not to study 
poetry but to study them, would be the more plausible models of egotisti 
cal assertiveness, and that we might show more discomfort than we are 
likely to witness soon by the parallel between their ambitions, which 
sometimes seem to include sweeping all other poets aside as pointless to 
read once The Daring New Poet is on the scene, and the finger-waving, 
"we're-number-one" form of American assertiveness that they themselves 
would often be among the first to belittle. 
But perhaps I've presumed too much. Perhaps Steele would not be 
drawn to such an argument. By way of conclusion, instead, he restates his 
central claim, that our loss of meter is a grievous loss, and quotes Frost's 
"The Aim Was Song." That would seem to be the aim of poetry that 
Steele would most admire. My own sense is that a more fitting final note 
would come from Henri Coulette, who has already been cited, and whose 
Collected Poems also came out from Arkansas last year. Take for example 
these final two stanzas of a late poem called "Newfangleness": 
The young are writing what they call free verse. 
Their fingers have forgotten how to count, 
Those delicate long fingers. 
No Anne Boleyn now would sigh, 
Struck by the cunning of her Wyatt's measure. 
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Old rooms, old tunes, old loves ?all of them gone. 
The watch is relentless, but its chime is sweet. 
Take up the minus sign 
? 
Go, run with the Abyss: 
You lose what you must love, yet you must love. 
I loved that poem when I first saw it. We ran it and seven more of Cou 
lette's later poems, all now in this fine volume. And by the way, the title 
word there, "newfangleness," was Chaucer's word before it was Wyatt's. 
D.H. 
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